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BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: The
Supreme Court Rejects a Punitive Damage
Award on Due Process Grounds

The Supreme Court of the United States has addressed the validity of
punitive damages awards many times over the years, but until now has
never overturned one based on a claim of excessiveness under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore1 is the first case in which the Court reversed and remanded
a large punitive damage amount based on those grounds.
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the United States Supreme
Court applied a three-part test to identify a punitive damage award that
violated the Due Process Clause2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 The
controversy in Gore began when Dr. Ira Gore purchased a new sedan
from the local authorized BMW dealer in Birmingham, Alabama.4 Nine
months after the purchase, an independent car dealer informed Dr. Gore
that the car had been repainted prior to his purchase.' Gore brought
suit against BMW of North America ("BMW") and the American
distributor of BMW automobiles, claiming that the failure to disclose the
car's condition constituted suppression of a material fact.6

1. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 which states: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
3. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
4. Id. at 1593.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Dr. Gore's allegation was based on an Alabama statute 7 that codified
Alabama's common-law cause of action for fraud.' At trial, BMW
acknowledged its policy of not disclosing to dealers any predelivery
damages that were less than three percent of the suggested retail price.9
Apparently, the car had come into contact with acid rain on its transAtlantic trip from Germany." The cost of repainting Dr. Gore's car
was only one and one-half percent of its value." Dr. Gore's complaint
prayed for five hundred thousand dollars in compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and costs. 2 BMW argued that it was not obligated13
to report the repairs because they did not materially affect the car.
BMW maintained that transactions in jurisdictions other than Alabama
should not be used by the jury to assess the amount of damages to
award. 14

The jury found actual costs of four thousand dollars and then
multiplied this by the approximate number of damaged cars sold in the
United States 5 to arrive at the four million dollar punitive damage
award.'
In a post trial motion to deny the punitive award, BMW
produced evidence that its nondisclosure policy was consistent with the
laws of twenty-five states.17 None of those states required disclosure
of repairs costing less than three percent of the suggested retail price.'
The motion also indicated that BMW's policy had never been found
unlawful before this action was filed. 9 The trial judge held that the
award was not excessive and denied the motion.2"
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
decision.2' The court applied a combination of factors it had developed
in prior cases and rejected BMW's claim that the award transcended
7. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-102 (1993). See also ALA. CODE § 4299 (1907). The statute
provides, "Suppression of a material fact which the party is under an obligation to
communicate constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may arise from the
confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case." Id.
8. 116 S. Ct. at 1593
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. BMW sold approximately one thousand cars, in different areas of the United

States, with similar percentages of undisclosed predelivery damages. Id.
16. Id. at 1593-94.
17. Id. at 1594.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994).
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constitutional limits.2 2 However, the court found that the jury's verdict
was wrongly calculated because it was based in part on incidents from
other jurisdictions."
The court held that "a reasonable punitive
damages award in this case" was two million dollars.24 The Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari and reversed the Alabama
Supreme Court, holding that the two million dollar punitive damages
award25 was grossly excessive, and therefore exceeded the constitutional
limit.

II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The decision in Gore was the first one in which the United States
Supreme Court expressly held a punitive damage award unconstitutional
under the "grossly excessive" language in the Due Process Clause. Prior
to BMW, the Supreme Court, as well as the individual Justices, had
expressed concern over the constitutionality of large punitive damage
awards.2' The court had mentioned the due process analysis in recent
opinions, but the Court always stopped short of reversing on "grossly
excessive" grounds.2 7

For example, in Browning FerrisIndustries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc.,25 petitioner sought due process protection based on the
amount of the damages awarded. However, the claim of excessiveness
under the Due Process Clause had not been raised in either the district
court or the court of appeals; therefore, the Court put the inquiry off
until another day.'
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,0 the Court finally
considered a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process challenge to a punitive
damage award. In that case, the Court conceded that a jury with
unlimited discretion in the fixing of punitive damages "may invite
extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities."3 ' The Court
also stated that it need not, and could not, draw a mathematical line

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
& Cas.

Id. at 625-27.
Id. at 627.
Id.
116 S. Ct. at 1598.
Browning Ferris Indus.,Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Bankers Life
Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988).

27. See Browning Ferris, 492 U.S. at 276-77; Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 87-88.
28.

492 U.S. 257 (1989).

29. Id. at 276-77.
30. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). In this case, plaintiffs were insured by defendant and brought
action for fraud, alleging that defendant's agent had accepted several premium payments
from plaintiffs even though the policy had been canceled without notice. Id.
31. Id. at 18.
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between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally
unacceptable awards that would fit every case. 2 The Court held that
the punitive damages in question did not violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.33 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
analyzed the factors used in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby,4 a case from the
Supreme Court of Alabama. The objective application of the Green Oil
factors to the facts in Haslip allowed the Court to find "a sufficiently
definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of the fact finders
in awarding punitive damages." 5 The Court reasoned that the
Alabama Supreme Court's post-verdict review ensured that punitive
damage awards were not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
offense and that the awards had some understandable relationship to
compensatory damages.36
37
In a later case, TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
the Supreme Court again recognized that the Constitution imposes a
substantive limit on the size of punitive awards. The Court decided
whether a particular punitive award was so "grossly excessive" as to
violate the Due Process Clause. 8 The Court upheld the award under
its analysis of the objective factors announced in Haslip.3 9
The first case in which the Supreme Court actually reversed a
punitive damage award was in Honda Motor Co. v. 'Oberg.4 ° In that
case, the Court was "not directly concerned with the character of a
standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive awards; rather
[the court] was confronted with the question of what procedures are
necessary to ensure that punitive damages are not imposed in an

32. Id.
33. Id. at 19.
34. 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989). The following were announced in Green Oil for
consideration in deciding whether an award is excessive or inadequate: (a) a reasonable
relationship between the punitive award and the harm likely to result from defendant's
conduct as well as the actual harm sustained; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of
defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any
concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability
to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and
of having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the financial position of the defendant; (e)
all costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its
conduct; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same
conduct. Id at 223-24.
35. 499 U.S. at 22.
36. Id.
37. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
38. Id. at 454 (citing Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909)).
39. Id. at 456.
40. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
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arbitrary manner."4 ' In particular, the Court addressed the Due
Process Clause as it related to the requirement of judicial review of
punitive awards.42
III.

THE SUPREME CouR's ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court of the United States found the punitive damage
award in Gore to be unconstitutional for two reasons.4 First, the
award violated the Commerce Clause by restricting defendant's action
in other states through the imposition of penalties in one state based on
out-of-state actions. 44 Second, the award was "grossly excessive" under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 5
The Court reversed the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court
because it found the punitive damage award to be "grossly excessive" in
relation to the State's legitimate interest in punishing unlawful conduct
and deterring repetition.4 6 The Court stated, "[olnly when an award
can fairly be categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to these
interests does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."47 The Court identified
Alabama's legitimate interests in punishing BMW,' and- then referred
to Healy v. Beer Institute,"' where it had previously held that "[pirinciples of state sovereignty and comity forbid a state to enact policies for
the entire Nation, or impose its own policy choice on neighboring
States." 0 The Court expressly stated that this type of imposition was
a violation of the federal power over interstate commerce. 1 The Court
required Alabama to support its economic penalties by focusing on the
interests of protecting its citizens and economy, not those of the
Nation. 2 The opinion centered on the notion of fairness that requires
notice not only of the conduct that will subject a person to sanctions, but
also of the severity of the punishment that a state may impose. 53

41.
42,
43.
44.

Id. at 420-21.
Id.
116 S. Ct. at 1597-98.
Id. at 1604.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 1595.
Id.
Id.
491 U.S. 324 (1989).

50.

Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1597 (citing Healy, 491 U.S. at 335-36).

51. Id.
52. Id. at 1598.
53. Id.
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The Court accepted the Alabama Supreme Court's interpretation of the
jury verdict, but disagreed with respect to the amount imposed in the
M Despite the fact that the United States
correction of the computation."
Supreme Court had previously upheld the Green Oil factors that were
the basis of the Alabama ruling in this case,"5 the Court analyzed this
situation under a different standard.5 6 The Court used three guideposts to find that BMW did not have any reasonable basis for believing
that a two million dollar award could be the cost of not adhering to its
nondisclosure policy, especially considering the policy was not in
violation of any other state's laws. 7
The first guidepost used to indicate a punitive damage award's
excessiveness is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct.'M The Court reasoned that BMW's infliction of harm was
purely economic in effect.6 9 There was no particularly malicious
intention behind the action, and BMW made no deliberately false
statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of improper
The second guidepost focused on the ratio between the
motive.'
compensatory damage and the punitive damage awards."' The Court
did not define an acceptable range, but found that the punitive award
was five hundred times the compensatory award determined by the jury,
and clearly outside of any acceptable range.62 The third guidepost
consisted of a contrast between the punitive award and the civil or
criminal sanctions that could be imposed under the particular state's
laws. 3 Alabama's fine for a similar action was two thousand dollarsf" This was substantially smaller than the punitive award of two
million.6" This discussion also considered the possible categorization of
BMW as a recidivist because of the previous suits filed by disgruntled
customers." This characterization was dispelled by the lack of notice
put forth from any state statute.6 7 The Court briefly mentioned the
lack of basis for assuming a less severe punishment would not fulfill the

54. Id.
55. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 458; Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20.
56. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1598.

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1599.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.

1601.
1602.
1603.
1600.
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objectives of imposing punitive damages.' Finding all three guideposts
dispositive of the conduct required for imposition of a large economic
penalty, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the Alabama
Supreme Court. 9
The concurring opinions sought to explain why the Court overcame the
presumption of validity that is based in reliance upon a tradition of
allowing the jury to decide matters through an impartial trial procedure.7" The concurrence also addressed the apparent inconsistency
between Gore and the opinion in 7XO. 71 The concurring Justices stated
that the Alabama courts "applied the 'factors' intended to restrain
punitive damage awards in a way that belies that purpose." 72 The
Alabama Supreme Court's decision resulted in a lack of protection from
unconstitutional and arbitrary results, and thus the United States
Supreme Court reversed.73
The dissenting opinions focused on what the Justices believed was an
improper intrusion onto grounds appropriately left for state courts.7
The basis for these arguments came from the skeptical view of the
Court's intrusion into this established area of the law. 5 Justice Scalia

stated, "[tihe Constitution provides no warrant for federalizing yet
another aspect of our Nation's legal culture

. .

., and the application of

the Court's new rule of constitutional law is constrained by no principle
other than, the Justices' subjective assessment of the reasonableness of
the award in relation to the conduct for which it was assessed."7M The
result, in the dissenters' view, will77 be a confusion in the interpretation
of what has now been proscribed.
IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS

Gore will likely have important implications in future litigation over
punitive damages.78 In civil litigation, plaintiffs' lawyers will be

68. Id.
69. Id. at 1604.
70. Id. at 1606-08 (Breyer, J., concurring).
71. Only three years earlier in TXO, the Supreme Court confirmed its use of the Green
Oil factors that it had used in Haslip as a standard by which to judge excessive punitive
damage awards. 509 U.S. at 458; see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
72. 116 S.Ct. at 1606.
73. Id. at 1605.
74. Id. at 1609-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1610.
76. Id. at 1610-11.
77. Id.
78. Victor E. Swartz, BMW v. Gore: What Does It Mean For The Future, 15 No. 1
PROD. LIAB. L. & STRATEGY, July 1996, at 1.
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limited in the extent to which they may present the tortfeasor's conduct
on a nationwide basis.7" If a defendant's conduct is lawful in one state,
it cannot be.used as evidence to increase or obtain punitive damages in
the state where the same conduct is deemed unlawful.8 0 Congress must
decide what should happen after the punitive damages are paid, and
when, if ever, the defendant should be punished again.8'
In throwing out as exorbitant the punitive damages award in Gore, the
Court has invited a flood of challenges to the traditional belief in the
wisdom of state juries in this area.82 The decision may influence
Congress and state legislatures to enact specific statutory limits on the
amount of punitive damage awards.8 3 This could have a negative
impact on the legal system.8 4 The unpredictability of a potential
punitive award is the cornerstone for deterrence of wrongful conduct by
a large corporation." If punitive damages are predictably certain, they
become just another item in the cost of doing business, much like other
production costs, and thereby induce a reluctance on the part of the
manufacturer to sacrifice profit by removing a correctable defect.8 8
Another problem will arise out of the conflict between the Gore factors
and the Green Oil factors developed in earlier cases.8 7 The Court did
not fully address its earlier opinions that do not follow the guideposts
put forth in Gore."8 A definitive test remains obscure.8 9 Lower courts
must choose from these conflicting standards in deciding how to
objectively evaluate a punitive award for excessiveness."' The Court's
opinion created a need for legislative action so that citizens and
corporations can rely on the law, and not randomness, when it comes to
civil punishment.9"

79. Id.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Editorial, Law and Justice, NAT'L L.J., June 3, 1996, at 8.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Brief for Respondent at 44, BMW of North America v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996)
(No. 94-896).
86. Id. (quoting Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F.
Supp. 69, 107 (D.S.C. 1979), affd, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981)).
87. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1614 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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In his dissent, Justice Scalia found what he called a "loophole" in the
majority's holding.' He believes the three guideposts proscribed could
possibly be overridden if there is a finding by -some court that the
punitive damages are "necessary to deter future misconduct. 3 Justice
Scalia predicted that state courts will often uphold punitive damage
awards as necessary in order to protect state interests.
The ultimate winner is not apparent yet, but the average consumer
will likely notice some changes resulting directly from this case. For
example, BMW enacted a nationwide policy of full disclosure soon after
the initial verdict was rendered,95 and some states have made headway
in passing laws related to these issues since this case arose," Many
state legislatures have enacted a variety of measures designed to curtail
awards of punitive damages.97 Also, at least one state legislature has
prohibited punitive damages altogether, unless a statute explicitly
provides for them. 98
In August of 1996, three months after the Court's opinion in Gore, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved
a model punitive damages act that was designed to improve state
procedures for the award and review of punitive damages." The Act
would require plaintiffs to show by "clear and convincing" evidence that
a defendant "maliciously intended to cause the injury or consciously and
flagrantly disregarded the rights or interests of others in causing the
° The Act does not impose an explicit cap on punitive damage
injury."'O
awards, 1 ' but it does require a consideration of factors that track
0 2 The act was approved by forty four of the over fifty
those in Gore."
jurisdictions voting. 10 3
The initial announcement of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Gore caused much celebration in the business community.'04 However, the jubilation may not last because of the effect on

92. High Court Finds Gore Award Excessive, Reverses $2 Million In Punitives, 5 No.
4 MEALY's EMERGING Toxic TORTS 10, May 31, 1996.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.

116 S. Ct. at 1592.
Appendix to opinion in 116 S. Ct. 1032.
116 S. Ct. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1612.

99, Marcia Coyle, Model Act Would Tighten Punitives, NATL L.J., Aug. 5, 1996.
100. Id.
101.

Id.

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Pamaela Anagnos Liapakis, Don't Rely On The 'Gore'Decision, NATL L.J., June
17, 1996.
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commercial as well as consumer cases. 0 5 The ruling opens the door
for introduction of past corporate misdeeds."° The practical effect
comes from the Court's linkage of large punitive damage awards to
habitual offenders, suggesting that, in these instances, there could be a
deterrent value to such awards."7 Obviously, this will not be the
Supreme Court's last case on excessive punitive damages, but for now,
awards in business cases will at least receive a higher level of judicial
scrutiny than other tort cases.'08
ROB S. REGISTER

105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.

